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RIDESHARING’S HOUSE OF CARDS: O’CONNOR V.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. AND THE VIABILITY OF
UBER’S LABOR MODEL IN WASHINGTON
Henry Ross
Abstract: Ridesharing companies, namely Uber and Lyft, have taken the transportation
market by storm. These companies offer a competitive alternative to taxis through using
smartphone apps and more efficient service offerings. As part of their business model,
ridesharing companies treat their drivers as independent contractors rather than employees to
minimize labor costs. However, drivers do not benefit from remedial labor statutes and thus
(1) must pay for operating costs, (2) are not guaranteed a minimum wage, and (3) do not
receive overtime pay. In O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., a class of California Uber
drivers are challenging their independent contractor status under California law. The test
used by California courts to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or an
employee differs slightly from the test that Washington courts apply. In 2012, the
Washington State Supreme Court adopted a worker-friendly “economic realities” test for
determining whether workers are in fact independent contractors. Applying the lessons from
O’Connor to Washington independent contractor law, this Comment calls into question the
viability of Uber’s labor model in Washington.

INTRODUCTION
Uber, the ridesharing behemoth, has upended the transportation
network in cities across the globe. As an alternative to the inefficiencies
of traditional taxis, the company uses a smartphone app to connect
customers with its drivers, which has proved to be a hit with customers.1
This immense popularity has driven Uber to expand into over 270 cities
and counting worldwide within a five-year period, and has led many to
anoint Uber as the most successful Silicon Valley startup ever after just
six years.2
With a network of over 160,000 drivers in the United States alone,
Uber has amassed an army of alleged independent contractors to drive

1. In response to Uber’s growth, some taxi companies have developed their own apps. Alexa
Vaughn, Seattle Yellow Cab on the Comeback Path, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 25, 2014, 8:24 PM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-yellow-cab-on-the-comeback-path/.
2. See Scott Austin, Chris Canipe & Sarah Slobin, The Billion Dollar Startup Club, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club/; Jay Yarow, At $12 Billion, Uber
Would Become the Most Valuable Startup in the World, BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2014, 3:29 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/at-12-billion-uber-would-become-the-most-valuable-startup-in-theworld-2014-5.
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its success.3 Uber’s independent contractor policy tracks a growing trend
among American companies of using independent contractors to avoid
workplace regulations.4 By virtue of their independent contractor
classification, Uber drivers and other independent contractors do not
have employee benefits, pay expenses out of pocket, and are not entitled
to guaranteed hourly wages or a salary.5
In O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,6 Californian Uber drivers are
challenging their independent contractor status.7 The plaintiffs allege
that Uber has improperly used the independent contractor designation to
save costs; in other words, Uber has made its rapid growth possible by
sacrificing full-employee benefits for its drivers to capitalize on lower
labor costs.8 Thus far, the drivers have been remarkably successful in the
suit. The trial court refused to grant Uber’s motion for summary
judgment after applying California’s relatively employer-friendly
independent contractor test.9 Indeed, based on the drivers’ apparent
momentum in the case, many have speculated as to whether this lawsuit
could lead to the end of Uber drivers’ independent contractor status in
California.10 The “right of control” test applied by the Northern District
of California trial judge is based on California’s independent contractor
law.11 The “right of control” test is the descendent of the traditional test
still used to determine whether the law may hold an employer liable for
the tortious conduct of an employee.12
3. Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Kreuger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s DriverPartners in the United States (Jan. 22, 2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/uber-static/comms/PDF/
Uber_Driver-Partners_Hall_Kreuger_2015.pdf.
4. Joshua Wright, Data Spotlight: Independent Contractors on the Rise, ECON. MODELING
SPECIALISTS INT’L (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.economicmodeling.com/2011/04/29/independentcontractors-other-noncovered-workers-on-the-rise/.
5. Maya Kosoff, 2 Lawsuits Could Dramatically Alter the Business Model for Uber and Lyft,
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2015, 11:10 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyft-businessmodels-threatened-by-lawsuits-2015-1.
6. No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015).
7. Id. at *1 (order denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment).
8. See id.
9. Id. at *15.
10. See, e.g., Alison Griswold, Are Uber Drivers Employees? The Trial That Could Devastate the
“Sharing Economy,” SLATE (Mar. 12, 2015, 12:54 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/
2015/03/12/uber_lyft_employment_cases_juries_could_decide_the_legal_fate_of_the_sharing.html.
11. See O’Connor, 2015 WL 1069092, at *4–5.
12. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and
How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 351 (2001) (“The [right to
control] rule that prevailed was based on an original facet of Blackstone’s master-servant model: a
master was liable for an act of the servant commanded by the master or committed in the course of
the servant’s service controlled by his master.”).
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In contrast to California’s test, in 2012 the Washington State Supreme
Court adopted an “economic realities” test for determining whether a
worker is an independent contractor for the purposes of the Washington
Minimum Wage Act.13 The “economic realities” test, while similar to
the “right of control” test, is a more progressive, worker-friendly test
that can often lead to a different result.14
The purpose of this Comment is to evaluate the legal reverberations
that O’Connor could have in Washington. If the drivers ultimately
succeed in their case using the more company-friendly California test in
O’Connor, the Uber labor model could face a serious and credible
challenge in any jurisdiction where drivers choose to bring such a suit.
Part I examines the regulatory backdrop of ridesharing companies, and
how the ascendency of Uber and other ridesharing companies has
challenged traditional transportation regulatory schemes. Part II explores
the factual and legal underpinnings of O’Connor. Part III discusses
Washington’s independent contractor law, particularly in light of the
Washington State Supreme Court’s Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package
System, Inc.15 decision, which signaled a new, worker-friendly approach
to independent contractor law in Washington. Finally, Part IV analyzes
Uber drivers’ likelihood of success in a misclassification claim, and
ultimately concludes that Uber’s labor model may not be viable under
Washington law.
I.

RIDESHARING COMPANY LABOR PRACTICES HAVE
DISRUPTED TRANSPORTATION REGULATORY
FRAMEWORKS

Uber has disrupted nearly a century of taxi regulations in America.16
Most notable to consumers, Uber has brought new technology, new price
structures, and consistently reliable service into the market.17 Less
visible to consumers are the labor practices these companies use in
hiring and managing drivers. Uber officially treats its drivers as

13. Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 871, 281 P.3d 289, 299
(2012); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.46.005–.920 (2014).
14. Kevin J. Miller, Welfare and the Minimum Wage: Are Workfare Participants “Employees”
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 184 (1999).
15. 174 Wash. 2d 851, 281 P.3d 289 (2012).
16. See, e.g., David Greene, Upstart Car Service Butts Heads with D.C.’s Taxis, NPR NEWS (Jan.
31, 2012, 2:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/31/146123433/upstart-car-service-butts-heads-withd-c-s-taxis.
17. Id.
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“independent contractors.”18 The independent contractor designation
carries numerous advantages for Uber’s bottom line: it does not have to
guarantee its drivers minimum wage and does not reimburse drivers for
on-the-job expenses incurred (e.g., gas and vehicle maintenance).19 To
understand how the independent contractor designation plays into the
Uber model, it is critical to understand the nature of the company, its
service offering, and the market in which it operates.
A.

Uber and the Onslaught of Competition in the Taxi Industry

Startup competitors of traditional taxi services have wedged their way
into a once airtight taxi market. The most notable competitors, Uber and
Lyft, use a simplified model that incorporates smartphone technology to
address two operational challenges faced by traditional taxi companies—
dispatch and payment.20 Instead of the traditional taxi-hailing process,
customers can order a ride on their phone through a simple smartphone
app.21 Drivers do not accept cash, and a customer’s credit card
information is already stored—and automatically charged following a
ride—on his or her phone by the smartphone app.22 Uber and Lyft use a
“surge pricing” model that raises prices when demand outpaces the rate
at which the services can respond to requests for rides.23 These new
companies also use customer reviews to reflect a driver’s quality, which
the company monitors as a form of remote driver supervision.24 The
rapid growth of these new services reflects their popularity.25 Indeed,
18. Griswold, supra note 10.
19. Kosoff, supra note 5.
20. Alexa Vaughn, Ride-Share Cars: Illegal, and All Over Seattle, SEATTLE TIMES (June 16,
2013, 9:09 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021206141_ridesharingappsxml.html.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Dan Kedmey, This Is How Uber’s ‘Surge Pricing’ Works, TIME (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://time.com/3633469/uber-surge-pricing/; Connor Adams Sheets, Uber, Lyft New Year’s Eve
Surge Pricing to Cost Riders, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2014, 7:35 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/
uber-lyft-new-years-eve-2015-surge-pricing-cost-riders-1771582.
24. Sam Roudman, Uber Drivers Organize Themselves in Seattle, Other Drivers Look to Do
Same, TECHPRESIDENT (May 27, 2014), http://techpresident.com/news/25078/uber-driversorganize-seattle-look-elsewhere.
25. Although the merits of less restrictive taxi policies are beyond the scope of this Comment, at
least one survey of economists suggests that ridesharing services disrupting the traditional
regulatory scheme is economically desirable. Taxi Competition, CHI. BOOTH IGM FORUM (Sept. 29,
2014, 9:10 AM), http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=
SV_eyDrhnya7vAPrX7. A panel of over forty economists was asked whether they agree or disagree
with the proposition that “[l]etting car services such as Uber or Lyft compete with taxi firms on
equal footing regarding genuine safety and insurance requirements, but without restrictions on
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many economists believe that customers are ultimately benefitting from
the introduction of ridesharing companies into the transportation web.26
Uber now operates in more than 200 cities in more than fifty countries,27
and was valued at forty billion dollars during a recent financing round to
raise additional capital.28
Public opinion surveys show why ridesharing services have
experienced such rapid growth. In a study commissioned by the City of
Seattle in September 2013, a time when Uber and Lyft were growing in
the area, over ninety percent of ridesharing customers rated the response
time of their ridesharing vehicle as “Good” or “Very Good.”29 In
contrast, only fifty percent of taxi customers rated the response time of
their vehicle as “Good” or “Very Good.”30 The study also found that
“[o]f 105 negative comments [received during the survey], 102 were
related to taxis. Of 16 positive comments, only 1 was related to taxis.”31
Additionally, on six specific metrics polled—(1) willingness to accept
credit cards, (2) courtesy of driver, (3) route knowledge of driver, (4)
appearance of vehicle, (5) promptness of arrival, and (6) ease of
booking/hailing a ride—ridesharing services received higher customer
ratings than taxis in every category.32
Despite a sleeker service, Uber’s business is in a legal grey area at
best, and is patently illegal at worst.33 Uber generally uses a “wait and
see” attitude when entering new markets—the service expands until
local governments actively enforce regulations or bring legal action. 34
Inevitably, the markets that Uber enters must respond in some fashion,
prices or routes, raises consumer welfare.” Id. Every single economist either agreed or strongly
agreed. Id.
26. Id.
27. 53 Countries: Available Locally, Expanding Globally, UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities
(last visited May 22, 2015).
28. John Shinal, Uber’s Valuation Tops Public Twitter, LinkedIn, USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 2014,
7:32
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/shinal/2014/12/08/uber-valuationcompared-with-twitter-linkedin-amazon-ebay-airbnb/20113797/ (examining current valuations and
speculating that Uber could give an IPO exceeding $100 billion dollars within a few years).
29. James M. Cooper & Ray Mundy, City of Seattle and King County Taxi, for Hire Vehicle and
Limousine Services Demand Study, Service Quality—Response Time Experiences, CITY SEATTLE
(Sept. 2013), http://clerk.seattle.gov/public/meetingrecords/2013/taxi20130903_1a.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id. at Service Quality—Key Observations.
32. Id. at Secret Shopper Surveys.
33. Greene, supra note 16.
34. See Michael B. Farrell, State Reverses Ban on Uber Car Service Ordering App, BOS. GLOBE
(Aug. 17, 2012, 1:55 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2012/08/15/state-reverses-banuber-car-service-ordering-app/yQTQNP9c1BQiEM3Mrri2oO/story.html; Greene, supra note 16.
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and many jurisdictions have elected to ban the service outright to
maintain the status quo for taxis.35
Though Uber largely encounters resistance because its services do not
conform to local taxi regulations, its aggressive business practices and a
series of public gaffes are responsible for at least a portion of that
resistance from customers, policymakers, and regulators alike.36 For
example, news leaked in November 2014 that Uber executive Emil
Michael once publicly suggested that Uber might use personal data
acquired in the course of business to humiliate journalists that are
unfriendly to Uber.37
The “surge-pricing” method has also cast Uber in a bad light.38
During a recent shooting and hostage situation in Sydney, Australia,
Uber applied surge pricing to the neighborhoods near the crisis because
of sudden demand for transportation in the area.39 This led to public
outcry.40 Despite its efforts to brand itself as a customer-friendly
alternative to taxis, these public gaffes serve to reinforce Uber’s image
as a cutthroat company when it comes to costs and revenues.
B.

The City of Seattle’s Response to Uber’s Emergence

After a lengthy period of non-enforcement, the City of Seattle became
America’s first major city to comprehensively address the influx of
ridesharing services.41 The ordinance resulting from these deliberations
created a permitting scheme that brought ridesharing companies, who
had been operating in Seattle without regulations for nearly three years,42
35. See Sara Roth, Portland Sues Uber Alleging Illegal Operations, USA TODAY (Dec. 10, 2014,
12:01
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/12/08/portland-sues-uber-for-illegaloperations/20117155/ (quoting Portland Mayor Charlie Hales: “Taxi cab companies follow rules on
public health and safety. So do hotels and restaurants and construction companies and scores of
other service providers. Because everyone agrees: good regulations make for a safer community.
Uber disagrees, so we’re seeking a court injunction”).
36. Frank Pallotta, Uber Exec Suggests Digging up Dirt on Journalists, CNN MONEY (Nov. 18,
2014, 10:25 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/11/18/media/buzzfeed-uber-dinner-journalists/
index.html; Uber ‘Truly Sorry’ for Price Rise During Sydney Siege, BBC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30595406.
37. Pallotta, supra note 36.
38. See Nicky Wolf, Uber Ride for Sleepy New Year’s Eve Partygoer Ends in $900 Bill, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/06/uber-900-billatlanta-new-years-eve-partygoer.
39. Uber ‘Truly Sorry’ for Price Rise During Sydney Siege, supra note 36.
40. Id.
41. See Vaughn, supra note 20.
42. Alexia Tsotsis, Spotted! Secret Uber Drivers on the Streets of Seattle, TECHCRUNCH (July 25,
2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/07/25/uber-seattle/.
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into the regulatory environment.43 Perhaps the most controversial aspect
of the legislation was that it placed a cap of 150 drivers on each
ridesharing company operating in Seattle.44 The Seattle City Council
expressed serious concern about the effect of ridesharing on the taxi
market, which serves a public purpose by transporting the disabled and
meeting transportation demands for public events.45 The Council chose
the 150-driver cap despite the fact that there were, according to
ridesharing companies, more than 2000 rideshare drivers in Seattle at
that time.46 According to rideshare companies, this limitation would
have destroyed their business model in the area and forced ridesharing
companies to leave the market due to decreased revenue.47 In effect,
these regulations would have compromised ridesharing companies’
supply and demand approach, as they would have been forced into the
rigid constructs of traditional taxi regulation.
Seattle’s ordinance lasted just a few months before the Council
repealed and replaced it.48 The Council based its decision to rewrite the
regulations in large part on the specter of a ballot initiative designed to
gut the first ridesharing ordinance.49 The most controversial portion of
the first ordinance—the cap on rideshare drivers—was removed from
the second ordinance.50 This cap ultimately gave ridesharing companies
a final victory; although the regulations retained some critical
provisions,51 removing caps on drivers allowed for unfettered growth.
Following Seattle’s lead, many prominent American cities have
passed ordinances bringing ridesharing services into the fold, or are in
the process of doing so.52 Thus, the significance of the legal issues
43. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124441 (Mar. 17, 2014).
44. Id. § 11(B).
45. Because ridesharing drivers generally use their own vehicles, imposing such a requirement on
ridesharing drivers would be impractical. Taylor Soper, Seattle City Leaders Sound off on RideSharing Dilemma – Who Do You Agree with?, GEEKWIRE (Feb. 28, 2014, 2:37 PM),
http://www.geekwire.com/2014/recap-city-council-meeting/.
46. Vaughn, supra note 20.
47. Id.
48. See Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 124526 (July 7, 2014).
49. Bill Lucia, City Council Passes Ride-Sharing Regulations. Again., CROSSCUT (July 14, 2014),
http://crosscut.com/2014/07/14/politics-government/121009/seattle-city-council-ridesharingregulations-legal/.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Ed Arnold, Uber Ready to Be Street Legal in Memphis, MEMPHIS BUS. J. (Jan. 23,
2015),
http://www.bizjournals.com/memphis/news/2015/01/23/uber-ready-to-be-street-legal-inmemphis.html (Memphis); Jeff Balke, Uber, Lyft Now Legal in Houston After Council Vote, HOUS.
PRESS (Aug. 7, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://blogs.houstonpress.com/news/2014/08/uber_lyft_now_
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surrounding Uber’s service will only expand. One of these issues sure to
become more prominent relates to the company’s labor practices.
C.

Uber Drivers’ Labor Practices and Workplace Environment

Independent contractor status is founded upon the scope, duties, and
nature of an individual’s work.53 While employees have recourse and
guarantees for certain workplace standards, independent contractors are
essentially on their own.54 Some estimate that companies can save up to
forty percent in administrative costs by designating employees as
independent contractors.55 Understanding the facts related to an
individual’s employment is therefore critical to determining whether
status as an independent contractor is proper.56
Uber is resolute about its drivers’ independent contractor status.57 The
company’s employment contract with drivers, which it terms a “software
license and online services agreement,” reflects this.58 Throughout the
contract, the language evidences a concerted effort by Uber to disclaim
all responsibility for the drivers’ contact with potential customers.59 For
example, when explaining a driver’s relationship with Uber, the contract
states that:
You [driver] acknowledge and agree that Company’s provision

legal_in_houston_after_council_vote.php (Houston); Tom Benning, Dallas Council Approves New
Car-for-Hire Rules; Uber and Lyft to Be Able to Operate Legally, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Dec. 10,
2014, 2:02 PM), http://cityhallblog.dallasnews.com/2014/12/dallas-council-approves-new-car-forhire-rules-uber-and-lyft-to-be-able-to-operate-legally.html/ (Dallas); Hal Dardick & Jon Hilkevitch,
Chicago Rideshare Regulations Approved, CHI. TRIB. (May 28, 2014, 1:30 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/chi-chicago-rideshare-regulations-approved20140528-story.html (Chicago); Paul Nussbaum, Ride Service Uber Gets OK in Pittsburgh Area,
PHILLY.COM (Aug. 21, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/business/transportation/
20140822_Ride_service_Uber_gets_OK_in_Pittsburgh_area.html (Pittsburgh).
53. Carlson, supra note 12, at 297–99.
54. Id. at 301. Therein lies the attraction of independent contractors to companies.
55. Adam H. Miller, Curbing Worker Misclassification in Vermont: Proposed State Actions to
Improve a National Problem, 39 VT. L. REV. 207, 210 (2014).
56. See, e.g., id.
57. Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement § 13.1 (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with
author).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., id. § 2.4 (“Company does not and shall not be deemed to direct or control you
generally or in your performance under this Agreement specifically.”); id. § 13.1 (“Except as
otherwise expressly provided herein with respect to Company acting as the limited payment
collection agent solely for the purpose of collecting payment from Users on your behalf, the
relationship between the parties under this agreement is solely that of independent contractors.”
(emphasis added)).
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to you of the Driver App and the Uber Services creates a direct
business relationship between Company and you. Company does
not, and shall not be deemed to, direct or control you generally
or in your performance under this Agreement specifically,
including in connection with your provision of Transportation
Services, your acts or omissions, or your operation and
maintenance of your Vehicle. You retain the sole right to
determine when and for how long you will utilize the Driver
App or the Uber Services.60
This language reflects Uber’s awareness of the fine line between
independent contractor and employee.61 Of course, a company’s
representation that an individual is an independent contractor and not an
employee is not the determinative factor in the independent contractor
analysis.62 Rather, the facts surrounding the individual’s labor (e.g.,
hours, permanency of the relationship, skill) are determinative.63
With respect to on-the-job requirements, Uber drivers are required to
maintain their cars’ cleanliness while soliciting and giving rides.64
Second, Uber requires its drivers to “maintain high standards of
professionalism, service and courtesy.”65 Finally, Uber requires its
drivers to pay operational expenses out of their own pocket.66 These
include “the cost of a car rental, insurance, gas, and normal wear-andtear.”67
The benefit for Uber drivers, however, is that they are free to choose
their own hours.68 While some drivers might choose to work fulltime or

60. Id. § 13.1.
61. See Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 335 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (“[T]here are a number of additional factors in the modern equation [for determining whether
an employee is an independent contractor], including . . . the length of time for which the services
are to be performed . . . and . . . whether the parties believe they are creating an employer-employee
relationship.”).
62. See, e.g., Brock v. Mr. W. Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1043–44 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[F]acile
labels and subjective factors are only relevant to the extent that they mirror ‘economic reality.’”
(citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961))).
63. Id.
64. Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement § 3.2 (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with
author).
65. Id. § 3.1.
66. Maya Kosoff, Here’s How Much Uber Drivers Are Really Earning, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 19,
2014, 5:29 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-money-uber-drivers-really-make2014-11.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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more, others may choose to work only a few hours per week.69 Although
Uber touts its drivers’ independence as a benefit of working for the
company, failure to meet the conditions noted above to Uber’s
satisfaction can result in a firing.70 Of course, because Uber considers its
drivers independent contractors rather than employees, referring to
driver termination as “firing” would be problematic. Thus, Uber uses a
more palatable term: “deactivation.”71 Its employment agreement states
the “[c]ompany reserves the right, at any time in the company’s sole
discretion, to deactivate or otherwise restrict you from accessing or
using the driver app or the Uber services if you fail to meet [company]
requirements.”72
Uber’s rating system, which is the basis for many “deactivations,”
gives riders the opportunity to grade their trip on a scale of one to five
stars.73 Because there is no bright line driver rating requirement to avoid
“deactivation,” Uber’s “deactivation” policy has left many drivers
worried about their job security:
Sudden firings—or in industry-speak, “deactivations”—can
leave drivers stranded without a source of income and no legal
recourse to fight the termination. Uber doesn’t tell drivers
upfront what will get them canned, just [sic] sends them
warnings once they’re already in hot water. Without a clear
policy of what makes a fireable offense, drivers are left to piece
it together by sharing their warnings and deactivation stories on
forums.74
Stories on these online forums are telling.75 Uber acknowledges that it
“deactivates” drivers for consistently poor reviews.76 The fact that Uber
69. Hall & Kreuger, supra note 3.
70. Abraham Riesman, We Asked 10 Black-Car Drivers If They Prefer Working for Lyft or
Uber—Here’s Why Lyft Won by a Landslide, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 7, 2014, 8:00 PM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/12/lyft-uber-drivers.html.
71. Id.
72. Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement § 3.1 (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with
author) (“Company reserves the right, at any time in Company’s sole discretion, to deactivate or
otherwise restrict you from accessing or using the Driver App or the Uber Services if you fail to
meet the [company] requirements.”).
73. Riesman, supra note 70.
74. Ellen Huet, How Uber’s Shady Firing Policy Could Backfire on the Company, FORBES (Oct.
30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/10/30/uber-driver-firing-policy/.
75. See What Is the Uber Process for Deactivation?, UBERPEOPLE.NET (Sept. 7, 2014),
http://uberpeople.net/threads/what-is-the-uber-process-for-deactivation.3185/.
76. Nairi, Feedback Is a Two-Way Street, UBER NEWSROOM (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://newsroom.uber.com/2014/04/feedback-is-a-2-way-street/ (“Have partner drivers been
deactivated for consistently poor ratings? You bet.”).
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dismisses drivers for poor job performance is neither surprising nor
objectionable. Rather, the disturbing trend for drivers is that they are
sometimes terminated without even being aware that their job
performance is sub-standard; and thus, their job is potentially in
jeopardy.77 Uber drivers have attempted to pin down exactly what the
minimum standards for “deactivation” are, but even Uber company
sources do not give a consistent answer.78 The only consensus on this
issue is that Uber does not tolerate subpar ratings: “Many drivers [have]
railed against Uber’s notoriously strict rating system, going so far as to
say it makes them fear their own passengers.”79
In summary, Uber drivers work in an environment with little
certainty. Uber’s employment agreement and publicly available
company policies on performance are vague at best. Drivers’ lack of
consistent contact with supervisors who ultimately decide whether a
third party’s opinion on the driver’s performance warrants firing
compounds this vagueness. Furthermore, by virtue of not being
designated employees, Uber drivers do not benefit from remedial labor
statutes, and thus theoretically have no claim against Uber when drivers
have a complaint about the nature of their workplace.80
D.

Many Uber Drivers Earn Below Minimum-Wage Incomes

Uber drivers’ exact earnings are as unclear as the circumstances of
their workplace supervision. In Uber’s view, because of their alleged
independent contractor status, drivers are not subject to state and federal
wage laws, and must pay out-of-pocket for job-related expenses.81
77. See Kara Kostanich, Uber Driver Claims Working Conditions Are Unjust, KOMO NEWS (Apr.
12, 2014, 8:33 AM), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/Uber-driver-claims-workingconditions-are-unjust-255021211.html?tab=video&c=y (referencing an interview with an Uber
driver, Danny, the blog post states, “Danny says if you get a couple bad ratings, your job is in
jeopardy”).
78. Jeff Bercovici, Uber’s Ratings Terrorize Drivers and Trick Riders. Why Not Fix Them?,
FORBES (Aug. 14, 2014, 8:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2014/08/14/what-arewe-actually-rating-when-we-rate-other-people/ (asserting the lack of clarity regarding minimum
requirements for drivers’ average ratings by comparing different minimums cited on Uber websites
for two different cities, London and San Diego); see also How the Rating System Works, UBER S.
FLA. (last visited Sep. 21, 2015) http://ubersouthflorida.com/how-does-the-rating-system-work/
(stating that a driver’s account is at risk of being deactivated when his or her average rating is below
4.6).
79. Reisman, supra note 70.
80. Dan Levine & Sara McBride, Uber, Lyft, Face Critical Courtroom Test over Driver Benefits,
REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2015, 7:15 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/28/us-uber-lyftworkers-idUSKBN0L11BN20150128.
81. See Ben Walsh, How Uber Fails to Prove Its Drivers Make More than Taxi Drivers,
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Indeed, because Uber does not track the expenses that drivers are
responsible for, even Uber itself cannot know exactly what drivers earn
after expenses.82 Nonetheless, a handful of available data points give
some indication of what Uber drivers actually make.83
In January 2015, Uber released a study commissioned for the
company and conducted by Uber’s Head of Policy Research Jonathan
Hall and former Obama administration advisor Alan Krueger.84
Although any self-commissioned corporate study will elicit some
skepticism, the study nonetheless offers a rare window into Uber
drivers’ earnings.85 The highlight of the study is that Uber claims drivers
in its six largest cities of operation earn roughly nineteen dollars per
hour.86 The study finds that this is roughly fifty percent more than
traditional taxi drivers.87 The study acknowledges, however, that it does
not account for driver expenses:
Of course, Uber’s driver-partners are not reimbursed for driving
expenses, such as gasoline, depreciation, or insurance, while
employed [taxi] drivers . . . may not have to cover those costs.
These costs vary for each driver-partner, and drivers may be
able to partially offset their costs by deducting work-related
expenses from their income for tax purposes, including
depreciation and/or leasing fees, gasoline, maintenance,
insurance, mobile device and data fees, and license and
registration fees depending on their particular tax situation. A
detailed quantification of driver-partner costs and net after-tax
earnings is a topic of future research. Nonetheless, the figures
suggest that unless their after-tax costs are more than $6 per
hour, the net hourly earnings of Uber’s driver-partners typically
exceed the average hourly wage of employed taxi drivers and
chauffeurs.88

HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2015, 3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/22/uberdrivers-pay-study_n_6527470.html (discussing flaws in Uber’s internal report regarding drivers’
pay).
82. Id. (discussing the key differences between gross and net pay).
83. See generally Hall & Krueger, supra note 3 (using limited pieces of data available to Uber
itself, such as gross receipts, to calculate drivers’ pay).
84. Id.
85. See id. at 18 (giving a rough estimation of drivers’ gross pay, and the factors that Uber
considers to determine same).
86. Id. at 23.
87. Id. (“Finding Uber-driver partners considered in survey made an average wage of $19.19 per
hour, compared to the average taxi driver wage of $12.90 per hour.”).
88. Id.
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The study also contains data on drivers’ lifestyles and employment
patterns. Over half of all drivers remain active Uber drivers after one
year of driving.89 Moreover, thirty-eight percent of Uber drivers drive
for Uber as their only job, compared to thirty-one percent that have a
separate full-time job, and thirty percent that have a separate part-time
job.90 Ninety-one percent of Uber drivers drive for Uber to earn
additional income to support themselves or their family financially.91
These calculations, and specifically the wage numbers, suggest that
Uber drivers make well above minimum wage. However, many
commentators have highlighted a number of flaws with the study.92
Much of this criticism centers on the study’s variation from previous
Uber reports on driver earnings.93 Specifically, three issues related to
driver compensation continue to be problematic for the Uber labor
model: (1) driver out-of-pocket expenses, (2) minimum-wage concerns,
and (3) driver inability to collect tips.94
First, in many places, the costs of purchasing and maintaining a
vehicle, including gas, may exceed six dollars per hour.95 Reuters News
Service has discussed one driver who claims he “spent about $150 to
$200 per week . . . on gas, $45 per week on car washes, $100 per month
for synthetic oil changes, plus insurance and other expenses while
driving his 2013 Dodge Dart at least 60 hours a week in San Diego.”96
These costs break down to roughly seven dollars per hour.97 While not
empirically representative of average Uber drivers’ costs, these figures
illustrate that the Uber study’s assumption that work-related driver costs
do not exceed six dollars may not be a safe assumption.98
Second, this report does not mention the considerable number of

89. Id. at 16.
90. Id. at 10.
91. Id. at 11.
92. See, e.g., Griswold, supra note 10 (highlighting flaws in assumptions that the study makes);
Walsh, supra note 81 (highlighting flaws in values that study gives for standard driver expenses).
93. See Griswold, supra note 10.
94. See Walsh, supra note 81.
95. Levine & McBride, supra note 80.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. As one commentator has noted: “The problem is that . . . [the Uber numbers] are all gross pay
numbers, but the two sets of drivers pay out costs in different ways. Taxi drivers tend to pay leasing
companies to use cabs maintained by medallion companies, and also pay for gas, while Uber drivers
are responsible directly for paying and maintaining everything they need to keep their car on the
road . . . . [W]ithout net earnings, the paper has no support for its most important claim—that Uber
drivers earn more money than taxi drivers.” Walsh, supra note 81.
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drivers who earn less than minimum wage according to prior data
releases from Uber. In 2014, the company released weekly earnings data
for its New York City drivers.99 According to this data, while many
drivers make competitive hourly earnings, a considerable portion of its
drivers make below ten dollars per hour.100 Other reports have
corroborated claims that some drivers earn less than minimum wage. 101
While such a problem has always been a concern in the taxi industry,
Uber’s independent contractor arrangement subjects drivers to the same
inconsistent wages without the job security of a taxi license or
medallion:
For thirty minutes of work [as a taxi driver], including loading
and unloading a passenger, a driver might earn $5—well below
the minimum wage. But the trade-off for the relatively low pay
was job security: stringent limits on who could pick up
passengers and restrictions on the total number of cabs in a
particular jurisdiction ensured drivers had enough work to make
a living.102
Thus, even if Uber’s data is genuine, it illustrates that while
compensation for taxi-like services may be similar, job security for Uber
drivers is significantly lower because of Uber’s ratings-based
“deactivations.”103
This minimum wage issue is even more glaring in cities subject to
higher local minimum wage requirements, which in at least one Uber
market is as high as fifteen dollars per hour.104 If Uber drivers make
99. Andrew, What Does a Typical New York UberX Partner Earn in a Week?, UBER NEWSROOM
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://newsroom.uber.com/nyc/2014/12/what-does-a-typical-new-york-uberxpartner-earn-in-a-week/.
100. Id. Ten dollars per hour is above the federal minimum wage, which provides for $7.25 per
hour, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012), but well below other minimum wages. See SEATTLE, WASH.,
MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 14.19, §§ 14.19.010–.080 (2014) (mandating a fifteen-dollar per-hour
minimum wage).
101. Maya Kosoff, Uber Drivers Speak Out: We’re Making a Lot Less Money than Uber Is
Telling People, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2014, 8:54 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uberdrivers-say-theyre-making-less-than-minimum-wage-2014-10 (“We spoke with more than a dozen
Uber drivers to see how much money they were making, and none of the numbers they gave were
even close to $90,000. In fact, a few drivers said they were struggling to even earn the minimum
wage. The drivers we spoke with say they’re making anywhere from $5 an hour to $20 an hour,
meaning that in a year’s time, if they’re working 40-hour weeks, they could be making anywhere
between $10,000 to $41,000.”).
102. John Liss, Uber and the Taxi Industry’s Last Stand, THE NATION (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://www.thenation.com/article/uber-and-taxi-industrys-last-stand/.
103. See supra Part I.C.
104. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 14.19, §§ 14.19.010–.080 (setting
minimum wage to fifteen dollars per hour).

13 - Ross.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

RIDESHARING’S HOUSE OF CARDS

11/13/2015 2:41 PM

1445

nineteen dollars per hour on average in Uber’s six largest markets,105
factoring in expenses would presumably bring many drivers below a
fifteen-dollar threshold. If so, Uber drivers’ potential lost wages due to
misclassification would be considerably larger in a city such as Seattle.
Third, Uber drivers generally do not receive tips from passengers,
who must pay through the app.106 In contrast to the traditional tipping
process for taxis, the company instructs passengers not to tip drivers.107
This policy is difficult to reconcile with the company’s belief that its
drivers are independent contractors, free to engage in business
relationships with customers, with Uber simply providing the app that
facilitates the relationship.108 If the drivers were indeed independent
contractors, it seems that drivers would have the independence to accept
tips.109
In summary, Uber drivers’ purported independent contractor status
combined with Uber’s restrictive rating policies diminishes their
compensation. As a function of this status, Washington statutes and
regulations designed to guard against detrimental wage conditions do not
apply.110 Broken down, data related to Uber drivers’ compensation
suggests that many drivers have similar problems to full-fledged
employees (e.g., less than livable wages), despite the fact that the drivers
do not benefit from workplace protections.111 Moreover, other workplace
commonalities, such as reimbursement for expenses, are not available
for Uber drivers.112

105. Hall & Krueger, supra note 3, at 23.
106. Maya Kosoff, Here’s How Uber’s Tipping Policy Puts Drivers at a Disadvantage, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2014, 2:26 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-tipping-policy-2014-10
(“[I]f you’re riding in an UberX, UberBlack, or UberSUV vehicle, there’s no way to include a tip
for your driver.”).
107. Do I Need to Tip My Driver?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/1be144ab-609a-43c5-82b5b9c7de5ec073 (last visited Jan. 29, 2015).
108. See First Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at 5, O’Connor v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2014), ECF No. 107,
2014 WL 7794845.
109. See id.
110. See Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 159 Wash. App. 35, 42–43, 244 P.3d 32,
41 (2010) (“[I]f the jury determined that the class members were employees and not independent
contractors, FedEx would be liable for overtime wages under the [Minimum Wage Act].”), aff’d,
174 Wash.2d 851, 281 P.3d 289 (2012).
111. See Hall & Krueger, supra note 3, at 26 (finding that Uber drivers average approximately
twenty dollars per hour in Uber’s most lucrative markets before expenses). As discussed above,
when expenses are added to these calculations, many Uber drivers’ wages are closer to minimum
wage levels.
112. Walsh, supra note 81.
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O’CONNOR V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES: UBER DRIVERS
CHALLENGE THEIR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
STATUS

Due to Uber drivers’ potential grievances, including low wages and
no compensation for on-the-job expenses, a class of California drivers
has sought legal recourse. In August 2013, Uber drivers filed a claim for
violation of California wage law.113 Uber has thus far been unable to
defeat the claim—Uber failed to win summary judgment and the issue
will go to a jury.114
A.

The Parties’ Arguments

Many of the foregoing facts discussed in Part I about the work of
Uber drivers115 have taken center stage in O’Connor. The drivers’
arguments separate into two categories: (1) Uber’s outward
representations about the role of drivers, and (2) Uber’s internal
treatment of drivers.116 Each of these are relevant to the independent
contractor analysis in this case.
First, with respect to outward representations, the drivers have cited
Uber’s marketing materials as evidence of their employee status.117 The
first sentence of the plaintiffs’ statement of facts in their brief opposing
summary judgment stated, “[i]n its own words, Uber is an ‘on-demand
car service,’ that has described itself to the public as ‘your on-demand
private driver.’”118 In addition, the plaintiffs cited Uber promotional
videos that present Uber as a transportation company, compared to
Uber’s claim that it is a software company.119 For example, in one
promotional video, Uber founder Travis Kalanick states that “the drivers
are the lifeblood of Uber.”120 Accordingly, the plaintiffs claimed that this
contradicts Uber’s contentions that it is merely a “technology” or

113. First Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 108, at 5.
114. O’Connor v. Uber Techs,. Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092, at *15 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 11, 2015).
115. See supra Part II.D.
116. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2–8, O’Connor, 2015 WL 1069092, ECF No. 222, 2015 WL 2456295.
117. Id. at 6–7.
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id. at 6.
120. Uber: Everyone’s Private Driver, VIMEO, https://vimeo.com/58800109 (last visited May 21,
2015) (promotional video posted to Uber’s vimeo company page); see also Plaintiffs’ Opposition to
Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 116, at 6.
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“software” company, as alluded to in the driver operating agreements.
The drivers assert that they could not be the “lifeblood of Uber” if Uber
is in fact a software company.121
Second, with access to voluminous company records in the discovery
stage, the plaintiffs presented evidence of Uber personnel exerting direct
control and supervision over drivers’ activities.122 For example, the
drivers cited emails in which Uber operations and management
employees comment, “Terrible Reviews, No second chance needed” and
“BANNING YOUR ASS AGAIN.”123 Additionally, the plaintiffs noted
that much of the training Uber drivers receive instructs drivers to ask
passengers about their temperature and radio preferences, and in some
cases requires that the radio be tuned to “soft jazz or NPR.”124
In its motion for summary judgment, Uber’s description of the
drivers’ work took a decidedly different tone. The motion described
Uber’s role in the driver’s work as simply forwarding requests for
pickups to the nearest drivers.125 Moreover, Uber asserted that what the
plaintiffs refer to as direct control over the drivers’ work is instead
merely “common-sense suggestions about how to achieve 5-star
ratings.”126 Additionally, among other things, Uber cited the fact that the
relationship is terminable at will at any time by any party, and that each
trip Uber drivers accept is voluntary, with no penalty or repercussion if
drivers choose simply to not perform the service.127
B.

California’s Unique Borello Test

In O’Connor, the court applied California’s unique Borello test to the
foregoing parties’ factual arguments to determine independent contractor
status.128 The test, as announced in the California State Supreme Court’s
landmark decision S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial

121. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 116, at 6.
122. Id. at 7.
123. Id. at 6 n.9 (emphasis in original).
124. Id. at 5.
125. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for Summary Judgment;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 4, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No.
C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015), ECF No. 211.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 9 (discussing the terms of the Software License and Online Services Agreement).
128. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 11, 2015).
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Relations129 uses a two-tiered structure.130 It looks first to traditional
common-law control, then to other considerations.131
In Borello, the California State Supreme Court addressed whether
migrant farmworkers were employees for California workers’
compensation purposes.132 After evaluating case law from other states
and federal courts, the Court announced the following test.133 First, the
Court reiterated the importance of the alleged employer’s right to control
the worker’s activities on-the-job (e.g., supervision, managerial
structure, or right to fire).134 Second, the Court gave some credence to
factors beyond the right of control:
However, the courts have long recognized that the “control” test,
applied rigidly and in isolation, is often of little use in evaluating
the infinite variety of service arrangements. While conceding
that the right of control work details is the “most important” or
“most significant” consideration, the authorities also endorse
several “secondary” indicia of the nature of a service
relationship.135
Looking primarily to the control that the employer exercised, the Borello
Court found that the migrant farmworkers were in fact full-fledged
employees.136
This “tiered” test, where the “right of control” is “most important,”137
is different from other jurisdictions’ independent contractor tests.138
Many jurisdictions simply group the right of control factor in with
Borello’s secondary indicia to create a test where no factor takes
precedence over others.139 California, on the other hand, uses this twotiered test, with the first tier addressing the right of control, and the
129. 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989).
130. Id. at 404.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 401.
133. Id. at 404. Note the distinction between a two-tiered and a two-step test. The Borello test
will always address both tiers, and the first factor is never dispositive. However, the “control” factor
is the most important part of the analysis.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 409.
137. Id. at 404.
138. Compare id. (using the right to control test), with Michelle M. Lasswell, Worker’s
Compensation: Determining the Status of a Worker as an Employee or an Independent Contractor,
43 DRAKE L. REV. 419, 422–24 (1994) (discussing the various other tests to determine whether an
independent contractor is an employee).
139. Id.
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second tier encompassing additional factors.140 Although the nuance of
each Borello factor is beyond the scope of this Comment, it bears
mentioning that the O’Connor court identified thirteen secondary
factors.141
C.

The O’Connor Analysis: A Victory for Drivers

Based on this two-tiered analysis, the trial court ultimately concluded
that Uber had not met its burden for summary judgment.142 The decision
rested on two related reasons. First, the trial judge found that Uber
drivers were “presumptively employees” under California law.143 The
significance of whether an independent contractor is a “presumptive
employee” under California law is primarily procedural, as opposed to
substantive.144 In general, once a worker shows that a service has been
provided to the alleged employer, the presumption applies and the
burden then shifts to defendants to show that the workers are indeed
independent contractors.145
Second, moving to the merits, the trial court began by addressing

140. See, e.g., Borello, 769 P.2d at 404.
141. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 11, 2015). Drawing on Borello, the O’Connor court listed the following as the thirteen factors:
(1) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(2) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision;
(3) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(4) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of
work for the person doing the work;
(5) the length of time for which the services are to be performed;
(6) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(7) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal;
(8) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee;
(9) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill;
(10) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his
employment of helpers;
(11) whether the service rendered requires a special skill;
(12) the degree of permanence of the working relationship;
(13) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business.
Id. For a detailed explanation of how independent contractor tests became so large and unruly, see
Carlson, supra note 12, at 351.
142. O’Connor, 2015 WL 1069092, at *6.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Id.; see also Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that once a
worker shows he provided a service “the burden shifts to the employer, which may prove, if it can,
that the presumed employee was an independent contractor”).
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Uber’s assertion that it does not directly supervise its drivers, which goes
to the alleged employer’s level of control.146 Although acknowledging
that Uber does not directly supervise its drivers, Uber’s propensity to
“deactivate” drivers that do not comply with specific standards appears
to be a form of indirect but significant supervision over employee
conduct.147 The court went on to acknowledge that Uber drivers’
personal control over their own hours could evince independent
contractor status.148 However, the court was more concerned about the
level of control Uber exercised while drivers were on the job:
The more relevant inquiry is how much control Uber has over its
drivers while they are on duty for Uber. The fact that some
drivers are only on-duty irregularly says little about the level of
control Uber can exercise over them when they do report to
work. Indeed, and as noted above, [courts interpreting California
law have] recognized this precise distinction in earlier cases
where hirees who were “not required to work either at all or on
any particular schedule” were nonetheless held to be employees
as a matter of law based on the amount of control the employer
could exercise when those employees decided to turn up for
work.149
Summarizing these two justifications, the court found that the right of
control factor, or “primary” Borello factor, did not warrant summary
judgment.150 With respect to the secondary Borello factors, the court
noted that some factors, such as drivers providing their own vehicles,
indicated an independent contractor relationship, while others, such as
the drivers forming “an integral part of Uber’s business” favored an
employment relationship.151 By analogy, the O’Connor trial court’s
analysis gives some insight into whether Uber drivers may be classified
as independent contractors under Washington law, which uses a slightly
different analysis.

146. O’Connor, 2015 WL 1069092, at *13.
147. Id.
148. Id. at *14.
149. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting JKH Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 142 Cal.
App. 4th 1046, 1051 (2006)).
150. Id. at *15.
151. Id.
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WASHINGTON DOCTRINES: “RIGHT OF CONTROL”
VERSUS “ECONOMIC REALITIES”

Courts have developed a litany of tests to delineate the bounds
between independent contractors and employees. For example, a claim
involving vicarious liability for tort purposes would implicate a different
test than an employee asserting employee status for wage purposes.152 In
contrast, a claim involving wage or workers’ compensation, such as
those at issue in O’Connor and Borello, respectively, would implicate a
different test.153
A.

Washington’s Iteration of the Traditional “Right of Control” Test

Traditionally, Washington courts have used a “right of control” test to
evaluate whether a business relationship is in fact an employee-employer
relationship.154 This test evaluates the extent to which an employer
controlled the actions of persons performing work for the business.155
Though similar to the Borello test, it does not “tier” any factors, and
instead uses the following equally weighted factors:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master
may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person
doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of
the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
152. See Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 871, 281 P.3d 289,
297 (2012) (explaining the various applications of independent contractor tests).
153. See id. (holding that the “economic realities” test applies to wage disputes).
154. See, e.g., Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 147 Wash. 2d 114, 119–21, 52 P.3d 472, 474–76
(2002) (using the right to control test to evaluate a misclassification claim).
155. Id.
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relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.156
In theory, if these factors tilt in favor of an employer-employee
relationship, it follows that the employer should be liable for the tortious
conduct of an employee.157
The origins of this test go back centuries.158 With the advent of the
industrial economy, employers were able to exercise increased control
over the conduct of their employees: “[I]ntegrated enterprise demanded
a large number of employees and the larger enterprise needed a high
degree of control and predictability which they could get with employees
but which was not possible in commercial relationships with individual
entrepreneurs.”159 Thus, placing liability on the employer became
common practice.160
The Washington State Supreme Court’s seminal case on the “right of
control” test, Hollingberry v. Dunn,161 gives a guiding example of how a
court might apply this test.162 In Hollingberry, an automobile collided
with three horses that escaped from a nearby farm, which resulted in the
death of a passenger.163 The farm owner had contracted with a worker to
seed an area surrounding a fence for a horse enclosure.164 The critical
facts were that (1) the farm worker used his own equipment, (2) used his
own methods of planting seeds, (3) both parties acknowledged that the
worker had superior seeding knowledge, and (4) the parties did not agree
to any fixed level of compensation.165 Despite the farm owner’s
instructions, the worker forgot to completely enclose the fence after a
day’s work, and the horses escaped.166 The farm owner voluntarily
settled with the decedent’s estate, and brought a claim seeking

156. Hollingberry v. Dunn, 68 Wash. 2d 75, 80–81, 411 P.2d 431, 435 (1966) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958)) (holding that, based on these factors, a sodding
contractor was not an employee).
157. See id.
158. See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 14 (1765) (explaining that those who hire
workers as “servants” should be held liable for those “servants’” actions).
159. John Bruntz, The Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: A Rose Is Not Always a
Rose, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 337, 340 (1991).
160. Id.
161. 68 Wash. 2d 75, 411 P.2d 431 (1966).
162. Id. at 81, 411 P.2d at 435.
163. Id. at 76, 411 P.2d at 431.
164. Id. at 78, 411 P.2d at 432–34.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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indemnification from the farm worker for negligence.167 The Court held
that the worker was an independent contractor, rather than an employee,
and thus the worker could not indemnify the farm owner.168 In its
reasoning, the Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, noting that
substantial evidence supported a finding that the “right of control”
factors supported the independent contractor designation.169
The “right of control” test in American jurisprudence can be traced
back nearly 200 years.170 Antiquated nomenclature such as “master” and
“servant” often accompany the test.171 The test is particularly unsuitable
for the modern employment law environment, which is governed
primarily by statute, and where the primary concerns are workplace
protections, such as a guaranteed minimum wage.172
Courts and commentators alike have criticized this test as unwieldy
and unpredictable.173 Because it uses ten different factors, the test can
lead to wildly different results.174 Moreover, as one commentator aptly
notes, America’s transition from industrial to a service-based economy
presents serious, potentially insurmountable, challenges to the traditional
test.175 Industrial jobs raise more concerns about employee welfare in the
workplace, and tests for independent contractors should reflect that.176
B.

The FedEx Saga and Modern Considerations
The need for a test that fits with modern realities of the workplace,

167. Id. at 76, 411 P.2d at 431.
168. Id. at 82, 411 P.2d at 435.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Inhabitants of Lowell v. Boston & L.R. Corp., 40 Mass. 24, 33 (1839) (giving a
“right to control” independent contractor analysis).
171. See, e.g., id. (“If a servant, in obedience to the command of his master, commits a trespass
upon the property of another, not knowing that he is doing any injury, he is nevertheless answerable
for the tort as well as his master, to the party injured; yet he is entitled to an action against his
master for the damages he may suffer, although the master also was ignorant, that the act
commanded was unlawful; because he is deemed the principal offender.”).
172. See Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 869–70, 281 P.3d
289, 297 (2012) (explaining the different purposes of the right to control and economic realities
tests).
173. See, e.g., Susan Schwochau, Identifying an Independent Contractor for Tax Purposes: Can
Clarity and Fairness Be Achieved?, 84 IOWA L. REV. 163, 180–81 (1998) (“Courts’ determinations
have been criticized for being based on only one or two factors . . . . The result is a ‘test’ in which
neither the factors nor their weights can be predicted.” (internal citations omitted)).
174. Id.
175. See Bruntz, supra note 159, at 340–41 (explaining the evolution of independent contractor
law in the context of economic and industrial transitions).
176. See id.
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such as wage and occupational health issues, is only growing;
independent contractors are becoming a larger portion of the American
labor force.177 This deficiency has resulted in extensive litigation. One
notable example involves dozens of lawsuits brought by FedEx Ground
delivery drivers alleging that the company misclassified them as
independent contractors and therefore owed back pay and
reimbursement for various job-related expenses.178 FedEx Ground uses
approximately 4000 drivers nationwide, all of whom it classifies as
independent contractors.179 The drivers have sued in a variety of contexts
and jurisdictions; thus, the tests and their application are varied.180 The
FedEx saga is representative of the impact litigation has in shaping
independent contractor law across the country
For example, in FedEx Home Delivery v. National Labor Relations
Board,181 FedEx refused to negotiate with duly elected union
representatives because the workers were independent contractors and
thus could not organize.182 In short, FedEx claimed that it used
independent contractors to drive its delivery trucks.183 FedEx assigned
the drivers a route, and the drivers had to complete the route on their
own time before a specified deadline.184 The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) ruled against FedEx in an administrative adjudication,
and FedEx appealed to the D.C. Circuit.185 Applying the “right of
control” test,186 the D.C. Circuit judges overruled the NLRB, holding
that the delivery drivers were independent contractors.187 The facts
177. Joshua Wright, Data Spotlight: Independent Contractors on the Rise, EMSI (Apr. 29, 2011),
http://www.economicmodeling.com/2011/04/29/independent-contractors-other-noncoveredworkers-on-the-rise/.
178. See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014);
Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 686 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2012); Huggins v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2010); FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492
(D.C. Cir. 2009); In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557 (N.D. Ind. 2010).
179. See FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 495 (discussing FedEx’s delivery workforce).
180. Compare id. (collective bargaining), with Craig, 686 F.3d 423 (wages).
181. 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
182. Id. at 495.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. The majority gave an interesting take on the modern application of the “right of control”
test, noting that “[f]or a time, when applying this common law test, we spoke in terms of an
employer’s right to exercise control, making the extent of actual supervision of the means and
manner of the worker’s performance a key consideration,” but over time the court recognized that
“some controls were more equal than others.” Id. at 496–97 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 504.
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showed that FedEx did not control the amount that drivers worked, did
not prescribe the specific hours during which they would work, and the
workers could even sell their own assigned routes to other drivers.188
The majority reasoned that the drivers therefore retained
“entrepreneurial opportunity.”189 This, according to the majority,
conformed to “right of control” precedent that emphasized
“entrepreneurial opportunity” as evidence that workers were
independent contractors.190 In reaching a different conclusion, an
impassioned dissent rejected this “entrepreneurial opportunity” take on
the “right of control” test, and called for adherence to the traditional
“right of control” factors.191
Other courts ruling on this FedEx saga have echoed the dissent’s
view. In Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.,192 the Ninth
Circuit found that drivers who worked in a capacity similar to the
workers in FedEx Home Delivery qualified as employees under the
“right of control” test.193 The factual circumstances in Alexander
deviated in three critical areas: (1) drivers were generally assigned
workloads that led to, at a minimum, nine-hour workdays; (2) drivers
were required to wear company uniforms; and (3) FedEx instructed the
drivers to act cordially toward customers.194 In light of these factual
differences, the court stressed that FedEx controlled the “manner and
means” of employment, which it held to be the most important factor in
the “right of control” analysis.
These two cases, and the litany of other FedEx independent contractor
disputes, give a representative example of the issues that are most
relevant to the “right of control” test.195 While Hollingberry sets out the
relevant factors, the FedEx cases give a glimpse of the factual
considerations at play in misclassification cases. A successful outcome
for Uber drivers in O’Connor could spark litigation in other states,
similar to that of the FedEx saga. Any such outbreak of Uber

188. Id. at 499–500.
189. Id. at 500.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 517 (Garland, J., dissenting).
192. 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014).
193. Id. at 997.
194. Id. at 985.
195. See, e.g., id.; Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 686 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2012);
Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2010); FedEx Home Delivery,
563 F.3d 492; In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 557 (N.D. Ind. 2010). These
cases all addressed nearly identical misclassification claims by FedEx delivery drivers.
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independent contractor cases would presumably result in a variety of
analyses similar to that of the FedEx cases, with potentially different
outcomes due to subtle differences in jurisdictions’ tests.196 A line of
Uber cases could lead to a similar result.
C.

Anfinson: The Washington State Supreme Court Forges a New
Path

The “right of control” and the California Borello test are not the only
tests courts use for determining independent contractor relationships;197
some courts have elected to use an “economic realities” test.198 While
related, this test departs from the “right of control” test in critical areas.
Most notably, it focuses on the wage and dependency of the worker on
the alleged employer instead of looking primarily at control.199 These
differences make the “economic realities” test better suited for
determining independent contractor status when wage and workplace
protection statutes are at issue, rather than liability concerns.200
The United States Supreme Court first established the “economic
realities” test in Bartels v. Birmingham.201 In that case, the Court
analyzed whether members of bands recruited by headlining singers
were employees, for purposes of social security, of the concert venues in
which they played.202 In determining the band members were not
employees, the Court cited the worker-protection purposes underlying
the applicable statute as its reason for departing from the “right of
control” test: “Obviously control is characteristically associated with the
employer-employee relationship but in the application of social
legislation employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are
dependent upon the business to which they render service.”203 The Court

196. Id.
197. See Deanne M. Mosley & William C. Walter, The Significance of the Classification of
Employment Relationships in Determining Exposure to Liability, 67 MISS. L.J. 613, 631–32 (1998)
(discussing the three independent contractor tests federal courts use in civil rights contexts: (1) the
“right of control “ test, (2) the “economic realities” test, and (3) a “hybrid” test).
198. Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor Law Regulation of
Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 671 (1996).
199. See id. at 667.
200. See Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 870, 281 P.3d 289,
297 (2012) (highlighting the economic realities test’s more effective application when addressing
wage concerns).
201. 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947).
202. Id. at 127–28.
203. Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
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listed the following factors that guide this analysis in addition to whether
the employer exercises control over the worker: (1) the permanency of
the arrangement, (2) the level of skill required, (3) the investment in the
facilities and materials for work, and (4) opportunities for profit or
loss.204 Taking a holistic approach to this test, the Court noted that “[i]t
is the total situation that controls.”205
The Washington State Supreme Court has recently adopted an
iteration of this test for determining whether an employee is an
independent contractor under wage statutes.206 In Anfinson v. FedEx
Ground Package System, Inc., Washington FedEx drivers brought a
claim in state court alleging violations of the Washington Minimum
Wage Act (MWA) and, as a corollary, the Federal Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).207 The MWA guarantees a minimum wage tied to inflation for
all employees, and not independent contractors, in Washington.208
Moreover, the statute states that employees are entitled to 150 percent
pay for overtime work,209 requires employers to maintain certain wage
records,210 and creates a statutory cause of action for workers paid less
than the MWA’s requirements.211 Although beyond the scope of this
Comment, the FLSA is the federal analogue for the MWA.212
In Anfinson, a class of FedEx drivers argued that FedEx misclassified
them as independent contractors.213 They sought back pay for overtime
hours worked under the MWA and compensation for required uniforms
under the Washington Industrial Welfare Act.214 Determining which test
for independent contractors applied in Washington for the purposes of
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 871, 281 P.3d 289, 297–
98 (2012).
207. 159 Wash. App. 35, 42–43, 244 P.3d 32, 35–36 (2010), aff’d, 174 Wash. 2d 851, 281 P.3d
189.
208. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.46.020 (2014) (guaranteeing a minimum wage for employees,
but not contractors).
209. Id. § 49.46.130(1).
210. Id. § 49.46.070.
211. Id. § 49.46.090. In addition to the MWA, Washington law includes a number of other
remedial labor statutes intended to protect the rights of workers, including the Industrial Welfare
Act (IWA), id §§ 49.12.005–.903, and the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973
(WISHA), id. §§ 49.17.010–.910.
212. Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 868, 281 P.3d 289, 295–
97 (2012).
213. Anfinson, 159 Wash. App. 35, 42–43, 244 P.3d 32, 35–36 (2010), aff’d, 174 Wash. 2d 851,
281 P.3d 189.
214. Id. at 42–43, 244 P.3d at 35–36.
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wage statutes was a matter of first impression for the Court.215 At trial,
the judge instructed the jury that the FedEx drivers were employees if
FedEx had the “right of control” over the drivers.216 Citing the federal
trend of using the “economic realities” test for FLSA purposes, the court
of appeals overturned this instruction, adopting the “economic realities”
test.217 This set the stage for the Washington State Supreme Court to
guide this matter of first impression.
The majority of the Court agreed with the court of appeals that the
“economic realities” test was the proper analysis.218 Writing for the
majority, Justice Owens gave a thorough analysis of the independent
contractor law landscape.219 First, as the court of appeals noted, the
MWA and FLSA both are intended to protect workers.220 Moreover,
Congress enacted the MWA at a time when federal courts, as evidenced
by Bartels, already used the “economic realities” inquiry for determining
independent contractor status under the FLSA.221
Second, the majority invoked the Washington remedial statute canon
of interpretation.222 Washington courts interpret remedial statutes
liberally and construe any exemptions from such statutes narrowly.223
This canon has been invoked in previous wage cases; in doing so, the
Court has noted that “Washington [has a] long and proud history of
being a pioneer in the protection of employee rights.”224 The Anfinson
majority’s application of the remedial statute canon fits with this line of
reasoning. Because it focuses on the economic well-being of the worker
rather than the employer’s control, many consider the “economic
realities” test to be a more progressive framework.225
Finally, the Court distinguished between the “right of control” and
“economic realities” tests. Specifically, the MWA and common law
vicarious liability are means to two very different ends226:
215. Id. at 41, 244 P.3d at 34–35.
216. Id. at 47, 244 P.3d at 38.
217. Id. at 53–54, 244 P.3d at 41–42; Anfinson 174 Wash. 2d 851, 281 P.3d 289.
218. Anfinson, 174 Wash. 2d at 871, 281 P.3d at 297–98.
219. See id. at 868–71, 281 P.3d at 297–98.
220. Id. at 869–70, 281 P.3d at 297–98.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 870, 281 P.3d at 298.
223. Id.
224. Drinkwitz v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 140 Wash. 2d 291, 300, 996 P.2d 582, 586–87
(2000).
225. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 12, at 323 (discussing the potential for the economic realities
test to be slightly more worker-friendly than other tests).
226. Anfinson, 174 Wash. 2d at 870, 281 P.3d at 297–98.
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[C]onsideration of the contrasting purposes of vicarious
liability—to which the right-to-control test set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 applies—and the MWA
bolsters our rejection of the right-to-control test. The right-tocontrol test serves to limit an employer’s liability for the torts of
another. By contrast, minimum wage laws have a remedial
purpose of protecting against “the evils and dangers resulting
from wages too low to buy the bare necessities of life and from
long hours of work injurious to health.”227
This reasoning is where Washington’s independent contractor law
regarding vicarious liability, such as that applied in Hollingberry,
diverges from wage-related independent contractor claims. On the
vicarious liability prong, the “right of control” test controls.228 On the
wage-disputes prong, the “economic realities” test controls.229
While making clear that the “economic realities” test is the proper test
for wage-based independent contractor suits in Washington, the
Anfinson opinion does not explicitly establish what factors comprise the
test.230 The majority cites two different tests as examples of the
“economic realities” test, but does not state which of these tests it wishes
to adopt.231 Some federal courts use a five-factor “economic realities”
test:
To aid us in this task, we consider five factors: the degree of
control exercised by the alleged employer; the extent of the
relative investments of the worker and alleged employer; the
degree to which the worker’s opportunity for profit and loss is
determined by the alleged employer; the skill and initiative
required in performing the job; and the permanency of the
relationship.232
Other federal circuits have tacked on a sixth factor that asks “whether
the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s
business.”233 By explicitly citing two slightly different iterations of the
“economic realities” test, the Court did not settle what precise factors
apply to the test under Washington law.
227. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 361 (1945)).
228. Hollingberry v. Dunn, 68 Wash. 2d 75, 82, 411 P.2d 431, 436 (1966).
229. Anfinson, 174 Wash. 2d at 871, 281 P.3d at 297–98.
230. Id. at 869, 281 P.3d at 296.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir.
1998) (citing Reich v. Circle C Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993)).
233. See, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Two justices disagreed with this analysis in Anfinson.234 In his dissent,
Justice Charles Johnson rejected the majority’s adoption of the
“economic realities” test as “unworkable.”235 He reasoned that by
evaluating the worker’s financial dependency on the employer, the test
could cover virtually all independent contractors: “the plaintiff drivers
are dependent on FedEx for their livelihood. But so too is the painting
subcontractor dependent on the builder, the tire manufacturer on General
Motors, the aviation electronics firm on Boeing, and so on.”236
Though Justice Johnson’s prediction could be accurate in theory, his
analysis ignores that the “economic realities” test adopted by the
majority is more nuanced than mere financial dependence. Indeed,
financial dependence is central to the inquiry, but the test implicates at
least five factors separate from simple financial dependence.237 It seems
doubtful Anfinson will spell the end of independent contractors in
Washington as the dissent seems to suggest that it will,238 particularly in
light of the aforementioned growth of independent contractors.239
IV.

APPLYING THE LESSONS OF O’CONNOR: QUESTIONING
THE VIABILITY OF THE UBER LABOR MODEL IN
WASHINGTON

Uber drivers have already brought class action suits in courts outside
of Washington.240 For example, in O’Connor, drivers are currently
pursuing wage and gratuities claims under California state labor
statutes.241 The outcome of the case will turn on whether they can
qualify as employees under California law.242 In contrast to the Anfinson
test used in Washington, California courts use the two-tiered Borello test
for wage independent contractor analyses.243 Although similar, the

234. Anfinson, 174 Wash. 2d at 878, 281 P.3d at 303 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 882, 281 P.3d at 304.
237. Id. at 869, 281 P.3d at 296–97 (majority opinion).
238. Id. at 882, 281 P.3d at 304 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
239. See Wright, supra note 4.
240. See generally Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2013 WL 4742878 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013), ECF No. 58.
241. See id. at *5.
242. See id.
243. See, e.g., Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Ct. App. 2007)
(“The essence of the test is the ‘control of details’—that is, whether the principal has the right of
control the manner and means by which the worker accomplishes the work—but there are a number
of additional factors in the modern equation, including (1) whether the worker is engaged in a
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Anfinson test has a decidedly different character: It does not give extra
weight to a single factor in the way the Borello test favors the “right of
control” factor over others.244
Thus, while a legal analysis of Uber drivers’ independent contractor
status in Washington would be different from the O’Connor analysis, the
lessons from O’Connor could be predictive of the facts and
interpretations that would be relevant to a similar analysis under
Washington law. Because the Anfinson Court gave a decidedly workerfriendly commentary on the test for independent contractors, O’Connor
suggests that Uber’s independent contractor labor model may not be
viable in Washington.
A.

Courts Using the “Economic Realities” Test Apply It as a WorkerFriendly Analysis

Courts’ progressive tone when discussing the “economic realities”
test is instructive for how Uber drivers’ potential claims may be
resolved.245 Because Washington’s adoption of the “economic realities”
test is rather recent, it is instructive that federal courts have consistently
found the “economic realities” test to be a particularly liberal analysis.246
For example, in Doty v. Elias,247 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
heard a case brought by restaurant employees alleging misclassification
as independent contractors for wage purposes.248 In that case, the
defendant stressed the fact that the plaintiffs could pick the hours they
worked (during the restaurant’s open hours).249 Despite this near
distinct occupation or business, (2) whether, considering the kind of occupation and locality, the
work is usually done under the principal’s direction or by a specialist without supervision, (3) the
skill required, (4) whether the principal or worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and place of
work, (5) the length of time for which the services are to be performed, (6) the method of payment,
whether by time or by job, (7) whether the work is part of the principal’s regular business, and (8)
whether the parties believe they are creating an employer-employee relationship.”). Notably,
California’s minimum wage statute was passed prior to the FLSA, and thus state courts have not
given weight to the federal courts’ use of the “economic realities” test for wage-based independent
contractor disputes. See Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 270 (Cal. 2010) (refusing to apply the
economic realities test given that the relevant California statute preceded the FLSA).
244. Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 869, 281 P.3d 289, 296
(2012).
245. See, e.g., Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1984) (discussing the “economic
reality” test’s friendliness for workers).
246. See, e.g., EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983); Hickey v. Arkla Indus.,
699 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1983).
247. 733 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1984).
248. Id. at 722.
249. Id. at 723.
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complete autonomy over hours, the court cited the fact that the majority
of plaintiffs were wholly dependent on working at the restaurant to make
a living wage.250 Since Doty, some have characterized this decision as
evidence of the “economic realities” test’s worker-friendliness.251 At
bottom, the critical threshold for plaintiffs is whether they can show that
they depend on the work for their livelihood, which encompasses a vast
number of independent contractors.252
In light of the test’s worker-friendly tilt, independent contractors who
claim they are misclassified will always have a head-start in their efforts
to persuade a court that they are in fact employees.253 This is in line with
the Washington State Supreme Court’s remedial statute interpretation
canon discussed above.254 Thus, Uber drivers will generally have a
greater chance at success under the “economic realities” test.
B.

The “Economic Realities” Factors Suggest Uber Drivers Qualify
as Employees Rather Than Independent Contractors

The primary requirement in Washington for gaining employee status
for MWA purposes is demonstrating that the six “economic realities”
factors favor employee designation.255 This inquiry is fact intensive.256
At each stage of the analysis, the economic dependence of the Uber
drivers will be “the lens through which [a court will] evaluate each of
the several factors.”257
1.

Uber’s Right of Control

The first factor in the economic realities test judges the “degree of
control” that the employer can exercise over the worker.258 As discussed
250. Id.
251. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 270–71 (10th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that the
economic realities test is inherently geared toward protecting workers).
252. See Doty, 733 F.2d at 723.
253. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 270–71 (discussing one interpretation of the FLSA-independent
contractor definition as a “liberal definition”).
254. See generally Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 281 P.3d
289 (2012).
255. Id. at 869, 281 P.3d at 298.
256. Id.
257. Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that
economic dependence of drivers is the foundation for the entire “economic realities” analysis).
258. See Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir.
1998) (citing Reich v. Circle C Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993) (listing “control” as
the first factor within the economic realities test)).
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above, this is the carryover factor from the earlier common law test.259
Since Anfinson, only one court has conducted a thorough analysis of the
economic realities factors. In Moba v. Total Transportation Services
Inc.,260 a federal district court applying Washington law ruled that based
on language in a contract guaranteeing that freight drivers were not
obliged to work at any certain time and authorizing drivers to work for
other freight companies, the right of control factor indicated the drivers
were independent contractors.261
Moba’s analysis overemphasizes the significance of formalities at the
expense of realities. When evaluating this factor, courts should not look
to the contract’s language as definitive evidence of control.262 If contract
language were dispositive, any company that seeks to treat workers as
independent contractors could simply write contract terms that seem to
bar the company from controlling the workers, and then exert control in
practice despite those terms. Instead, courts should look to how the labor
scheme works in practice to determine whether the company does in fact
exert control over the workers; as the Fifth Circuit has noted, “[i]t is not
significant how one ‘could have’ acted under the contract terms. The
controlling realities are reflected by the way one actually acts.”263
Looking at Uber drivers’ practical circumstances, Uber does exert
some pressure in dictating how drivers do their job. First, as discussed
above, Uber uses a surge pricing model that creates zones where drivers
have a temporary financial incentive to serve because of high demand in
that area.264 Second, the company effectively requires a significant level
of courtesy on the job because of its strict “deactivation” policy.265
Third, the discussion in O’Connor about the subtle instructions that Uber
gives its drivers, such as suggesting the radio be tuned a certain way or
the air conditioning properly monitored, cuts in favor of the drivers on
this factor.266 Of course, there are periods when Uber drivers are alone in
their vehicle on the job, without direct supervision. Thus, the outcome

259. See supra Part III.
260. 16 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
261. Id. at 1264.
262. See Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that
the primary focus of the control factor is the interaction and relationship between the parties, not
nomenclature).
263. Id. (quoting Brennan v. Partida, 492 F.2d 707, 709 (5th Cir. 1974)).
264. Kedmey, supra note 23.
265. Riesman, supra note 70.
266. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 116, at 5.
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on this factor is by no means absolute. In summary, Uber rarely, if at all,
exercises direct control (e.g., face to face) over its drivers. However, it
does use secondary methods of control, such as supervising ratings and
encouraging consistent habits, to exert some control over drivers’ onthe-job conduct.
2.

Drivers’ Opportunity for Profit or Loss

The “opportunity for profit or loss” factor turns on the extent to which
an individual’s level of performance on the job can increase or decrease
one’s financial success.267 For example, if highly skilled individuals can
make comparatively large amounts of money based on those skills, the
arrangement would tilt toward an independent contractor relationship.268
By contrast, if all alleged employees’ compensation is similarly
proportional to the amount of labor performed, the circumstances
suggest that the worker is an employee rather than an independent
contractor.269
Uber drivers seemingly have little opportunity for exceptional profit
or loss. According to one court evaluating this factor in the context of
delivery drivers, when “experienced drivers knew which jobs were most
profitable,” the “profit or loss” factor tilted in favor of independent
contractor status.270 Such is not the case with Uber: Uber’s own data
suggests that the drivers who work the most hours per week—
presumably the most experienced—do not, on an hourly basis, earn
much more than infrequent drivers.271 Uber drivers’ opportunity for
profit based on superior skill is negligible at best, which favors
employee designation.
3.

Drivers’ Investment in Required Equipment or Materials

The “investment” factor relates to the “profit or loss” factor.272 The
touchstone of this factor is as follows:
If the worker supplies more of the tools and materials for the
267. See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1536 (7th Cir. 1987) (analyzing
farmworkers’ opportunity for profit or loss under the economic realities test).
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1998).
271. See Hall & Kreuger, supra note 3, at 18 (showing that Uber drivers’ compensation does not
increase as they work more hours).
272. See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1537 (discussing farmworkers’ investment in their gear and
tools).
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work, for instance, the worker’s investment increases, she is
exposed to greater risk of loss or opportunity for profit, and it
becomes more likely that she is an independent contractor. An
employee, by contrast, brings only his personal services to the
relationship, and the employer provides all the supplies and
equipment.273
Of course, independent contractors often bring their own materials to
jobs. Courts have not established a clear threshold that alleged
employees must meet to tip this factor in their favor.274 Courts have,
however, reasoned that “[w]hen an employer furnishes valuable
equipment, an employment relationship almost invariably exists.”275
This expansive reading fits with the economic dependence “lens” that
courts often use when evaluating these factors.276
Driving for Uber requires two essential tools: an app and a car. Uber
provides drivers with the tool most important to their job: the Uber
app.277 Although Uber’s business model depends principally on the app,
Uber drivers have the option of supplying their own vehicles and
smartphones or their own vehicle and smartphone.278 These
considerations make the “investment” factor with respect to Uber drivers
rather even.
4.

Whether the Service Requires a “Special Skill”

Uber drivers follow their phones’ directions, pick customers up, and
drop them off.279 One could perhaps make extra money by having
knowledge of popular areas to request rides. However, the occupation
does not require a special skill.280 In O’Connor, Uber attempted to make
the argument that drivers can significantly affect their earnings by using
expertise or skillful techniques.281 Even so, if giving rides to customers

273. Carlson, supra note 12, at 351.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., Potter v. Mont. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 853 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Mont. 1993) (citing
Solheim v. Tom Davis Ranch, 677 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Mont. 1993)).
276. See supra Part IV.B.
277. See Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with
author).
278. Id.
279. See Vaughn, supra note 20.
280. Compare FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 500–01 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (delivery
driving), with Hollingberry v. Dunn, 68 Wash. 2d 75, 78, 411 P.2d 431, 432 (1966) (seeding).
281. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. for Summary Judgment;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, supra note 125, at 4.
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for money requires a special skill for the purposes of this test, it is hard
to imagine what forms of labor would not require a special skill. 282
Indeed, part of the appeal of becoming an Uber driver is that anyone
who knows how to drive can make money by working as a driver.
Dissimilarly, at least one federal court has found that delivery drivers
can qualify as independent contractors.283 In FedEx Home Delivery, the
D.C. Circuit ruled that FedEx drivers who had to take a short course in
delivery driving could qualify as specially skilled employees.284 Thus,
while Uber driving may not seem like an especially “skilled” profession,
facts may support both sides of this factor. Contrast Uber drivers with
the relationship in Hollingberry, which the parties entered into because
the worker was particularly knowledgeable in “seeding,” a bona-fide
specialty.285 In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that welding, which is
a decidedly skilled profession, is the type of “special skill” that this
factor contemplates.286 If an activity as common as driving a car
qualifies as a special skill, it is difficult to imagine what would not
qualify as a special skill. Accordingly, driving for Uber should not
require a particularly special skill.
5.

Permanence of the Relationship

Although Uber’s driving contracts specify that the relationship is
terminable at will,287 the relationship is nevertheless more permanent
than the traditional conception of independent contractor
relationships.288 Consider, for example, the Hollingberry arrangement in
which the seeder contracted to complete a discrete job: seeding an
enclosed area.289 In contrast, Uber drivers work with no defined end. Of
course, Uber drivers are free to stop driving whenever they choose.290

282. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Technologies Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 116, at 25 (highlighting the very few opportunities that drivers have to make
profits above the average driver).
283. FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 500–01 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
284. Id.
285. Hollingberry, 68 Wash. 2d at 78, 411 P.2d at 432.
286. Carrell v. Sunland Constr., Inc., 998 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1993).
287. Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement § 2.4 (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with
author).
288. See, e.g., Hollingberry, 68 Wash. 2d at 78, 411 P.2d at 432 (holding that a sodding employee
tasked with a single job did not have a particularly permanent relationship with the other party).
289. Id., 411 P.2d at 433.
290. Uber, Software License and Online Services Agreement § 2.5 (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with
author).
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Under the language of the contract, there is no guaranteed employment
period.291 Thus, although Uber drivers have an immediately severable
relationship with Uber, the fact that the arrangement is for an indefinite
period makes the resolution of this factor non-absolute.
6.

Whether the Service Rendered Is an Integral Part of the Business

The final factor evaluates the importance of workers to the alleged
employer’s business. In some instances, courts have found employees
who, at first glance, are not crucial to a business’s livelihood are
nevertheless an integral part of the business. In Dole v. Snell,292 a cake
business’s decorators challenged their designation as independent
contractors.293 The court, citing the very name of the business, “Cakes
by Karen,” reasoned that the employees were “obviously” integral to the
business.294
Uber would not exist without drivers. Although the company touts
itself as a “technology company,” it earns revenue from its drivers
giving a portion of their fares to Uber.295 Consider the company’s own
slogan. When users open the Uber app, they see the words “[e]veryone’s
private driver.”296 If cake decorators qualify as an integral part of a
business named “Cakes by Karen,” drivers would logically qualify as an
integral part of a business that represents itself as “everyone’s private
driver.” Uber drivers are integral to the company’s business, and this
factor, therefore, favors employee status.
C.

Contrasting the Economic Realities Analysis with the O’Connor
Analysis

In summary, the factors favor full-employee classification for Uber
drivers. The drivers have little opportunity for profit or loss, their job
does not require a special skill, and Uber drivers are essential to the
company’s business model. The only clearly countervailing factors are

291. Id.
292. 875 F.2d 802 (10th Cir. 1989).
293. Id. at 802–04.
294. Id. at 811.
295. Marlize van Romburgh, Uber in S.F. Is Now Three Times Bigger than City’s Entire Taxi
Industry, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015 10:04 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/
blog/techflash/2015/01/uber-valuation-revenue-sf-taxi-industry-kalanick.html.
296. Alyson Shontell, Uber CEO Explains His Company’s Highly Ambitious Goal to End Car
Ownership in the World, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2015 12:07 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
ubers-plans-to-be-cheaper-than-owning-a-car-2015-2.
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that the relationship is not permanent and Uber does not exercise
significant control over its drivers’ daily activities. In light of these
factors, Uber drivers have a viable claim under the “economic realities”
test, as adopted by the Washington State Supreme Court in Anfinson, for
employee designation under Washington wage statutes.
The “economic realities” test is similar to the Borello test used in
California, but lacks a predominant control factor.297 As discussed
above, Uber drivers have thus far been successful in California, a
jurisdiction where control is the predominant factor, despite the fact that
the control factor is not as favorable to the drivers’ case as other factors
within the analysis.298 In other words, if drivers can have success in
O’Connor, it follows that drivers could be even more successful in
Washington, a jurisdiction where control is not predominant.
The implication of possible claims on the part of drivers should not be
understated. If the drivers are indeed employees, Uber would be required
to guarantee minimum wage, reimburse for expenses, and comply with
worker protection regimes such as workers’ compensation schemes.299 In
any case, the success of the O’Connor plaintiffs calls into question
whether Uber would be able to survive a similar challenge in a
jurisdiction, such as Washington, with an arguably more worker-friendly
independent contractor test.
CONCLUSION
The ascendance of Uber in the ridesharing industry has been a boon to
consumers.300 Much of this benefit has come at the expense of drivers,
who are not guaranteed many of the labor protections that most
employees enjoy.301 O’Connor v. Uber Technologies represents what
could be the first of many lawsuits against Uber for misclassification of
employees. When analyzing the distinctions between the California and

297. Compare Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wash. 2d 851, 869, 281 P.3d
289, 296 (2012), with S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 403
(Cal. 1989).
298. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 11, 2015).
299. David Bauer, The Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four Billion
Dollar Problem, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 138, 144–51 (2015).
300. See Taxi Competition, CHI. BOOTH IGM FORUM (Sept. 29, 2014, 9:10 AM),
http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel/poll-results?SurveyID=SV_eyDrhnya
7vAPrX7 (showing that a vast majority of economists surveyed believe that ridesharing has
increased taxi competition and thus benefitted consumers).
301. Kosoff, supra note 5.
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Washington independent contractor tests, serious questions about the
viability of Uber’s labor model emerge. After the Washington State
Supreme Court’s opinion in Anfinson v. FedEx, Uber drivers potentially
hold the power to upend the rapidly-growing ridesharing industry in
Washington. Although Uber designates its drivers as independent
contractors, this designation may be erroneous. Courts are sure to
address this question in the near future, with the result in O’Connor
instructive as to how such a lawsuit would play out in Washington. As
the number of independent contractors in America continues to grow,
the issue could drive independent contractor litigation in other industries.

